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What May Have Become a New Title VII Precedent
on Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Piscataway
Township Board of Education v. Taxman -
"Permissible or Impermissible?"
I. INTRODUCTION
There were two teachers, Sharon Taxman and Debra
Williams, but due to budget cuts, one would lose her job.'
Unfortunately, this time around, the Piscataway Township Board of
Education could not do what it usually does when confronted with this
type of dilemma because this time things are different. 2 Piscataway's
policy for lay-offs had routinely been to lay off in the reverse order of
seniority;3 however, this time around, things were different because
Ms. Taxman and Ms. Williams were both hired on the same day.4 So,
the School Board next looked at both teachers' qualifications, but
despite the fact that Ms. Williams had a master's degree in addition to
all the credentials that Ms. Taxman had, the School Board declared
both teachers equally-qualified.5  The School Board then decided,
because Ms. Taxman was white, and Ms. Williams was black, it
would use the school district's affirmative action plan as a tiebreaker.
6
Ms. Taxman lost her job.7
This note looks first at the historical foundation of affirmative
action under the guise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8
examining both the objectives of the Act and the guidelines by which
to achieve its objectives.9 This is followed by an examination of two
Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547,1551 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing
the subsequent lawsuit filed by Taxman in which she alleges employment discrimination
in violation of both federal and state statutes).
2 Id. at 1551 (explaining the process for lay-offs).
Sld. (statutory tenured teachers are laid off in reverse order of seniority).
4 Id. Both employees began employment on the same day. Id
5 See Brett Pulley, A Reverse Discrimination Suit Upends Two Teachers'
Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at 1, 32.
6 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551. The Board used its discretion and invoked an
affirmative action policy to break the tie between the two teachers. Id.
7 See id. Ms. Taxman was dismissed from her job on June 30,1988. Id.
8 See infra Part II; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
9 See infra Part 11; Theresa Marks, Note, Johnson v. Santa Clara County
Transportation Agency: Affirmative Action Expanded Under Title VII, 18 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 567, 571-72 (1988).
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important Title VII cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court,' 0  United Steelworkers v. Weber," decided in 1979, and
Johnson v. Santa Clara County,12 decided in 1987. Particular
attention is given to the Court's interpretation of Title VII in both
cases and the issues the Court addressed. Next, this Note will review
the facts and the procedural history of Piscataway Township Board of
Education v. Taxman, which was scheduled to be argued before the
United States Supreme Court in January, 1998, until the parties agreed
to settle the case.' 3 Specifically, the section discusses Title VII issues
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed on
appeal. 4 Lastly, this note discusses the arguments and concerns the
Supreme Court would have confronted in adjudicating this case in
light of Weber and Johnson;15 the same concerns that ultimately led
the parties to settle the case.16
II. TITLE V11 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
During the 1960s, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as part of its effort to eliminate discrimination
against blacks.' 7  Title VII prohibits employers from making
employment decisions on the basis of race or color, but it also
prohibits employers from discriminating based on religion, sex, or
'
0 See infra Part III.
"43 U.S. 193 (1979). See infra Part III.A.
12480 U.S. 616 (1987). See infra Part III.B.
13 See infra Parts IV, V, VI and VII.
14 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1549-50. Here the Court specifically addresses the
issue of whether Title VII allows an employee to grant a "nonremedial, racial preference
in order to promote racial diversity" when the workforce is already racially balanced. Id.
1S See David G. Savage, Workplace Bias to the Fore: Court to Rule on
Factoring Race Into Employment Decisions, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 40. See infra pp. 22-
30.
16 See Jonathan Jaffe, Piscataway Ends Race Case Lawsuit; White Teacher to
Get Back Pay, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Nov. 21, 1997, at 1.
17 See Marks, supra note 9, at 569 (discussing Congress' goal in enacting
Title VII as an effort to do away with racial prejudice and racial discriminatiori
confronting blacks in their attempt to attain equality in employment and in education).
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national origin.18  Concerned that simply prohibiting discrimination
would not be sufficientto redress the impact of past discriminatory
practices and to allow minorities and women to achieve unbiased
representation in the workforce,' 9 employers around the country began
implementing special programs, known as "affirmative action" plans.
The purpose of these plans was to assist minorities and women in
fully participating "in the nation's economy.,, 20 As a result, Title VII
has accorded validity to affirmative action plans and policies.
2 1
To administer Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).22 In 1979, the EEOC attempted to clarify Congress' intent in
enacting Title VII by establishing criteria that an employer can use to
implement an affirmative action plan consistent with the goals of the
23
statute. The EEOC first determined that Congress intended
employers to voluntarily implement their own affirmative action
plans.24 According to the EEOC, an employer's plan is consistent
with Title VII when the objective of the plan is to root out "practices,
procedures, or policies" that have negatively affected minorities and
women and to remedy the effects of past discrimination.25  An
employer's effort to remedy past discrimination or its effects may
consist of training programs, comprehensive recruitment practices and
modified criteria for policies concerning hiring, promoting, collective
bargaining and terminating employees.2
In the end, when an employer's self-initiated affirmative
action plan adheres to EEOC criteria, that employer is considered to
'8 See Henry Schuldinger, Casenote, Still Searching for the Limits of the
Permissible Use of Affirmative Action: United States v. Board of Education of the
Township of Piscataway, 6 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 97, 102 (1996).
19 Marks, supra note 9, at 571.
20 Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 102.
21 Marks, supra note 9, at 571.
22 BARBARA A. BARDES ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS TODAY: THE ESSENTIALS 136 (1994-1995 ed.).
23 Marks, supra note 9, at 571-72.
24 Id. at 571.
25 Kathryn A. Sampson, Note, Negotiating a Slippery Slope: Voluntary
Affirmative Action After Johnson, 14 J. CORP. L 201, 212 (1988) (discussing the EEOC's
criteria for employers desiring to implement affirmative action plans).
26 -,
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have made a good faith effort to adopt its plan in accordance with the
guidelines set forth by the EEOC.27 The employer is, thus, insulated
from any potential Title VII claims.28  The result is that in
adjudicating Title VII claims, the Supreme Court has decided to give
much consideration to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute and to
its "guidelines, findings and opinions."29
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The United States Supreme Court has decided several
affirmative action cases not involving Title VII, where the Court
struck down an employer's plan because it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 To the contrary,
the Supreme Court, in deciding two significant cases involving Title
VII, upheld the employers' affirmative action policies that benefited
women and minorities as permissible under Title VII. 31  United
Steelworkers v. Weber,32 which the Court decided in. 1979, and
Johnson v. Santa Clara County,33 decided in 1987, are the two leading
cases on the issue of permissibility, under Title VII, of affirmative
action in the workplace.34
A. United Steelworkers v. Weber
As stated by Kathryn A. Sampson in the Journal of
Corporation Law,35 Weber was the first case the Supreme Court
decided involving affirmative action in employment.36 Brian Weber,
27 Marks, supra note 9, at 572.
28 id.
29 id.
30 See Savage, supra note 15, at 41.
31 id
32 443 U.S. 193.
33 See 480 U.S. 616.
34 See Savage, supra note 15 (discussing the U.S. Supreme" Court cases
United Steelworkers v. Weber and Johnson v. Santa Clara County).
35 See Sampson, supra note 25, at 201.36 See id. at 213-14.
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an employee of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, was
denied admission into a training program implemented in 1974 as a
result of a collective-bargaining agreement between Kaiser and 'the
United Steelworkers of America.37  This training program was' an
affirmative action effort designed to increase racial balance and,
specifically, the number of blacks within Kaiser's highly skilled work
force.38 To achieve its objective, Kaiser decided to accept trainees
into the program based on seniority, but set aside fifty percent of the
vacancies for blacks, which would be used only until the program
achieved its overall objective.39 Brian Weber brought a class action
suit against Kaiser and United Steelworkers. The suit was brought on
behalf of himself and other white employees who applied to the
program and were denied admission, while blacks with less seniority
were accepted.40  The issue before the Court, narrowly stated by
Justice Brennan, was "[w]hether Title VII forbids private employers
and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative
action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for the
purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."41  The majority
concluded that it did not.42
In addressing this issue, the Court looked at several factors,
the first being Title VII itself. 43 The Court concluded that Congress'
goal in enacting this statute was not to make unlawful "all voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action."" The Court determined, rather,
that Congress enacted Title VII in response to concerns throughout the
country regarding historical racial inequity from one century to the
37 See Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 (explaining that Kaiser adopted this training
program in order to increase the number of black craftworkers in its predominantly white
workforce).
38 See id. at 199 (outlining Kaiser's goal to preserve at least 50% of the
vacancies in the training program for blacks until the proportion of black craftworkers
was representative of the proportion of blacks in the local workforce).
39 See id. (discussing selection of craft trainees).
40 See id. at 199 (describing how the most senior black selected into the
training program had less seniority than several white candidates).
41 Id. at 200.
42See Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (stating that Title VII does not prohibit the
private sector from initiating race conscious affirmative action plans).
43 See Sampson, supra note 25, at 213-16 (discussing the Weber decision).
44 Id. at 214.
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next. It would not be consistent with Congress' goal to interpret Title
VII as precluding an employer from voluntarily initiating efforts to
remedy past discrimination, since this is precisely what Congress
wanted employers to do.45 After further review of the construction
and legislative history of Title VII,46 the Court then turned to Kaiser's
plan to determine whether it was consistent with the statute.47
The Court first considered the objective of Kaiser's plan and
held that it reflected the same objectives as Title VII, in that the plan
and the statute were both designed to eliminate racial discriminatory
practices and racial segregation.48 Next, the Court considered whether
Kaiser's plan "unnecessarily trammel[ed] the interests of white
employees" and held that the plan did not because there was no need
to layoff white employees in order to hire blacks.49 Furthermore, the
plan did not automatically hinder the progress of white employees.50
Finally, the Court looked at the duration of the plan and concluded
that the plan was temporary, as Kaiser would discontinue the plan
once it achieved its objective of an increased racial balance in its
skilled work force.51  Although the Court failed to draw a clear
distinction between those affirmative action plans that are permissible
under Title VII and those that are not, it ultimately held that the
Kaiser's affirmative action plan was permissible under the statute.52
The Supreme Court's three-part analysis in deciding Weber has
become the foundation for how courts should approach Title VII
claims challenging the permissibility of an employer's affirmative
action plan.
53
45 See id. at 215 (discussing the inconsistencies of construing Title VII as a
prohibition against all private sector affirmative action plans).46 See Weber, 443 U.S. 193.
41 See id.
48 See id. at 208 (explaining the purpose of both the affirmative action plan
and the statute). The Court states that both are identical. Id.
49 id.
50 Id.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09.
52 Id. at 208.
5' See Margaret Erin Buckley, Affirmative Action: Voluntary Affirmative
Action Plans Under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 GEO. WASH L. REV.
711, 712 (1988) (explaining the first two prongs of the test, the first of which asks
whether the purpose of the affirmative action plan reflects the purpose of Title VI1, and
360 [Vol. XV
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B. Johnson v. Santa Clara County
Eight years after Weber, the Supreme Court decided its second
Title VII case involving affirmative action in the workplace. 54 Unlike
Weber, Johnson v. Santa Clara County involved the permissibility of
an employer's voluntary affirmative action plan based on gender.55 In
1978, the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, by its own
initiative, implemented an affirmative action plan that allowed the
agency to take gender into consideration as an ameliorating factor
when making decisions to promote employees into positions that had
routinely been held by men. 56 Paul Johnson, a male employee of the
transportation agency, filed suit on the grounds that he was passed
over for a promotion.57
Justice Brennan, again writing for the majority, narrowly
stated the issue as "whether in making the promotion[,] the Agency
impermissibly took into account the sex of the applicants in violation
of Title VII . . . "58 Because women have experienced discrimination
similar to that experienced by blacks,59 and because Title VII prohibits
discrimination in employment decisions based on race and gender,60
the Court approached Johnson similarly to how it approached
Weber.6 1 In reviewing the application of Title VII to gender based
discrimination, the Court extended its statutory interpretation in
the second which considers whether the plan pre-empts the interests of nonminority
employees not benefited by the plan); see also Chris Engels, Voluntary Affirmative Action
in Employment for Women and Minorities Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act:
Extending Possibilities for Employers to Engage in Preferential Treatment to Achieve
Equal Employment Opportunity, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 731, 746-47 (1991) (outlining
the three-prong test, the third prong being that the court must find the plan temporary in
nature and not permanent in that, the plan must be structured to achieve its goals within a
certain period of time).
54 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 108.
55 Johnson, 480 U.S. 616.
56 Id. at 620-21.
57 Id. at 625. He stated in his brief that the agency, in complying with the
affirmative action plan, promoted a female employee, Diane Joyce, who had fewer
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Weber to this case and held that "Title VII does not prohibit voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action where it is necessary . . to
eliminate a 'manifest imbalance' that reflect[s] underrepresentation of
women in 'traditionally segregated job categories. '"962
The Court then applied its three-prong analysis. 63 The first
prong asks whether the objectives of the Santa Clara plan reflect the
objectives of Title VII. 64 The Court found that the impetus behind the
plan was the same as that of Title VIL65 Santa Clara's consideration
of Joyce's sex in deciding to promote her was a remedial effort to
address a "manifest imbalance" as evidenced by the
underrepresentation of women in "traditionally segregated job
categories. ' 6
The Court then considered the second prong of Weber and
determined whether Santa Clara's plan "unnecessarily trammeled the
rights of male employees or created an absolute bar to their
advancement. 6 7 In deciding this factor, the Court looked at several
aspects of the plan.68 The Court examined the plan in light of the
Kaiser-USWA plan, which reserved fifty percent of the vacancies in
its training program in favor of blacks.69 The Court recognized that
Santa Clara's plan was not designed to achieve a certain percentage of
females in any given job category but, instead, was designed to allow
the agency, when considering an employee for promotion, to take into
account certain affirmative action factors during its consideration. 70
In this case, Joyce's sex was not the only factor taken into
consideration, just one of several elements. 7 1  The Court further
elaborated that Joyce was never guaranteed the promotion as a result
of the plan because Santa Clara considered her against all the other
62 id.
63 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 63 1.
64 See id. (asking whether the employment decision at hand was made
pursuant to a plan that was similar to that in Weber).
61 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 637-38.
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candidates including Johnson, and no one was denied consideration as
a result of the agency attempting to comply with the plan.72
The Court then determined whether Santa Clara's plan met the
third prong of the Weber analysis, which required the Court to look at
the duration of the plan. 73  In reviewing this factor, the Court
considered the language of the plan, which set forth Santa Clara's
intention to "attain a balanced work force," but it made no mention of
an intention to "maintain" one.74 The Court concluded that although
the plan did not specify its duration in terms of a set time frame or a
specific goal to achieve, 75 it did meet Weber's "temporary" criteria.
The goal was not to maintain a permanent balance along racial and
gender lines, 76 but to slowly achieve balance within Santa Clara's
workforce. The plan would achieve it in a way in which employment
decisions would be made realistically and in a manner which would
not unnecessarily infringe upon the valid expectations of employees
not targeted to benefit from the plan.77 In essence, the Court did not
necessarily find that the plan itself was temporary but, rather, found
that the plan was not permanent. 78 The Supreme Court's three-part
analysis, introduced in Weber and further developed in Johnson, has
become the legal framework for adjudicating Title VII claims. 79
IV. THE HISTORY OF PISCA TA WAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OFEDUCATION V.
TAXMAN
In 1989, the Piscataway, New Jersey, Board of Education
needed to eliminate one teaching position within the Business
72 See id.
73 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639.
74 Id. at 639.
71 See id. at 640.
76 Id.
77 See id. (discussing how the Agency has taken a gradual approach to
eliminating imbalance).
78 See Sampson, supra note 25, at 227 (stating that the plan was geared only
at attaining a balanced workforce).
79 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 105 (stating that "Title VII cases
continue to follow the" three-prong test of Weber and Johnson).
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Department at Piscataway High School. 80 Generally speaking, when a
school board is faced with having to make lay-offs, New Jersey State
law requires the school board to terminate non-tenured teachers first
and then tenured teachers in the "reverse order of seniority."'8I Sharon
Taxman, who is white, and Debra Williams, who is black and the only
teacher of color in the Business Department, were the two teachers in
the department with the least seniority.82 Taxman and Williams were
actually of equal seniority because they had both been hired on the
same day.8 3 Sincethe School Board could not make its decision based
on seniority as to which teacher it should lay off, it decided to review
both teachers' qualifications. 84
Taxman possessed a bachelor's degree in business education,
a comprehensive teaching certificate that allowed her to teach an array
of business education courses from bookkeeping and accounting to
business math and business english. She also had three years of prior
teaching experience at the high school level before coming to
Piscataway. 85  Williams also possessed a bachelor's degree in
business education and held a comprehensive teaching certificate that
certified her to teach the same courses as Taxman. 6 While Williams
had less than a year of teaching experience before coming to
Piscataway, she possessed a master's degree in business education.87
After reviewing both teachers' qualifications, which included equally
impressive performance evaluations,88 the School Board concluded




84 See Pulley, supra note 5, at I (acknowledging both teachers' educational
backgrounds: Taxman attended the State University of New York at Buffalo, where she
earned a bachelor's degree in business education; Williams earned a bachelor's degree in
business education from Mississippi Valley State University and she earned a master's




8 See Harvey Berkman, Exhibit A: White Employee Strikes Back; An Agency
Explains Why it Switched Sides, After Winning a Reverse-Bias Award, The US. Justice
Department Argues Against It, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1995, at A 12.
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that, with regard to the factors that affected their decision making,
both teachers had equal qualifications.
89
In the past, when confronted with a lay-off decision involving
two employees with equal seniority, the School Board invoked a
tiebreaker based on "a random process which included drawing
numbers out of a container, drawing lots or having a lottery."90
Because of the rare nature of this case - where one teacher is black
and the other white - the school superintendent recommended that
the School Board make its decision based on the school district's
affirmative action policy.9' Because Williams was the only black
teacher in the Business Department at Piscataway High School, the
School Board decided that it would retain Williams and terminate
Taxman92 in order to achieve racial diversity within the department.
93
The School Board based its decision on the superintendent's
recommendation to invoke the Board's affirmative action policy.94
After the School Board terminated Taxman, she filed an
employment discrimination complaint with the EEOC and the New
Jersey Division on Civil Rights.95 The United States government
eventually filed a Title VII claim against the Piscataway School Board
on the grounds that the School Board's policy was impermissible
under the statute, and Taxman joined the suit, challenging also the
permissibility of the plan under Title VII. 96 Incidentally, Ms. Taxman
was rehired in 1993 upon another teacher's early retirement.97
89 See DeWayne Wickham, In Affirmative Action Case, Public Opinion
Counts, Too, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1997, at 15A.
90 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551 (quoting the brief filed by the Piscataway
Township Board of Education).
91 Id.
92 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
93 See Jonathan Jaffe, Appeals Court Upholds Reverse-Bias Damages, STAR-
LEDGER (NEWARK), Aug. 10, 1996, at 11.
94 id.
95 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 119.
96 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
97 See Pulley, supra note 5.
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V. PISCATAWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION'S AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PLAN
In 1975, the New Jersey State Board of Education mandated
that all school districts within the state implement a policy promoting
equal opportunity in education by creating two affirmative action
plans: one targeted at practices used in the classroom and another at
practices used in making employment decisions.98 By the end of that
year, the Piscataway Township Board of Education adopted an
affirmative action plan with the objective of offering equal
educational opportunities to students and equal opportunities in
employment to employees. 99 There was no question that the School
Board's objective was not to address past discrimination and its
effects.' 00
Eight years later, the Piscataway School Board adopted a
formal policy entitled "Affirmative Action-Employment Practices,"
which replaced the plan's initial "equal opportunity" objective.' 10 The
newly adopted policy allowed the School Board, when making
decisions regarding employment, to make recommendations based on
race in cases where two candidates were deemed equally-qualified.0 2
VI. UNITED STATES V. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THE TOWNSHIP OF
PISCATAWAY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF NEW JERSEY
In adjudicating the United States' claim that the School
Board's action was impermissible under Title VII, the district court
first reviewed the affirmative action plan under the Title VII standard
as established by Weber and Johnson.10 3 Based on the first prong of
the Weber/Johnson analysis, the district court determined that an
98 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 115.
99 Id.
I° Id. at 116.
101 Id.
10 2 Id.
103 United States v. Board of Educ. of Tp. of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. 836,
842 (D.N.J. 1993).
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employer may consider race in making decisions regarding
employment only when an affirmative action plan is designed to
remedy past discrimination. 10 4 The School Board admitted that its
plan was not designed for remedial purposes, but that its goal was to
"promot[e] racial diversity for the sake of education."'1 5 Because
there was no precedent enumerating this non-remedial purpose, the
district court refused to stretch the boundaries established by Weber
and Johnson to include diversity as a purpose permissible under Title
In the absence of clear Title VII direction on whether diversity
is a permissible affirmative action goal, the district court relied on
cases involving claims against employers' affirmative action plans
that were brought under the Constitution. 10 7 The Supreme Court, in
adjudicating prior affirmative action claims brought under the
Constitution, had held that any effort other than one to remedy
specific acts of discrimination would fail the test for constitutional
permissibility.'08 In applying a constitutional analysis to the School
Board's affirmative action plan, the court found that the plan did not
meet the constitutional standard of remedying prior discrimination. 0 9
The district court, ruling in favor of the United States and Taxman,
granted them summary judgment on the issue of liability, 1° and the
School Board appealed."'
The district court's review of Taxman's Title VII challenge
under a constitutional analysis was flawed. 12 The court failed to
recognize that the standard by which the Supreme Court reviews Title
VII challenges is very different from the standard the Court uses in
reviewing challenges brought under the constitution1 13  In
adjudicating constitutional claims against an employer's affirmative
114 See id. at 844, 846.
'o' Id. at 845.
106 id.
107 Id. at 121.
1
08 Id.
109 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 121.
"10 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
111 Id. Taxman also appealed the district court's ruling on damages. Id.
112 id.
113 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 12 1.
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action plan, the Supreme Court imposes on the employer a higher
standard of review and a greater burden of proof than it does in
adjudicating Title VII claims.' 4 The district court's analysis of the
School Board's plan was terribly fragmented because the court
commingled two different routes of legal analysis, both of which had
different objectives." 5
VII. TAXMAN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF
PISCATAWAY, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of the School
Board's liability under Title VII. 16 In doing so, the court needed to
decide only whether the School Board's affirmative action plan was
valid under the statute, as interpreted under both Weber and
114 See id.; Sampson, supra note 25, at 208-11 (comparing the differences
between the standards of review and the burdens of proof employed in constitutional and
statutory adjudication). The constitutional standard of review is concerned with applying
the appropriate level of scrutiny, either "strict" or "middle-tier." In Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, Justice Powell insisted that all racial classifications are
presumptively unconstitutional and, therefore, could not be justified unless its use is
necessary to the achievement of a compelling state/governmental interest. Justice
Brennan, however, proposed that benign racial classifications, although presumptively
unconstitutional, should be reviewed according to a lower level of scrutiny whereby, the
racial classification could be sustained if it serves an important (not compelling)
state/governmental objective, and is substantially related (not necessary) to the
achievement of that objective. The constitutional standard is also concerned with whether
there is evidence of past racial discrimination and whether the employer's affirmative
action plan is narrowly tailored to achieve its objective. The statutory standard of review
also contains a level of scrutiny, but the Supreme Court has not defined it in terms of
either "strict" or "middle-tier," but requires that the purpose of the affirmative action plan
mirror the purpose of Title VII. This standard does not mandate that there be specific
findings of past racial discrimination in that, the Court has never held that affirmative
action plans are allowed only to remedy past discrimination and its effects. Lastly, the
Title VII standard is similar to the constitutional standard because it is concerned with
whether the plan is excessively intrusive on the rights of those not benefited by the plan).
115 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 122 (explaining how the district court
erred in its analysis).
116 id.
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Johnson.17 In determining the validity of the plan based on the first
prong of the three-prong test, the court addressed whether the racial
diversity objective of the School Board's plan reflected the objectives
of Title VIC"8 The two primary objectives of Title VII, as stated by
the court, are "to end discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin, thereby guaranteeing equal
opportunity in the workplace, and to remedy the segregation and
underrepresentation of minorities that discrimination has caused in our
Nation's work force."'"19
The court of appeals concluded, after reviewing the legislative
history of Title VII, that Congress did not consider diversity as one of
the goals of the statute.' 20 The court further concluded that as long as
an affirmative action plan has some remedial purpose, the plan can be
considered to "mirror the purposes of the statute ....,,121 Because the
School Board's plan, according to the court, served no remedial
objective, but only the goal of "promoting racial diversity 'for
education's sake, ' , 122 the court found the plan impermissible under
Title VII in terms of the ends that it sought to pursue.
23
The court then looked at the second prong of Weber/Johnson,
which asks whether the School Board's, plan excessively intrudes on
the expectations of nonminorities 24 The court of appeals concluded
117 Id. at 1557 (stating that this case involves "straight forward statutory
interpretation" of Title VII as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Weber and Johnson).
118 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1550 (stating the purpose of.affirmative action
plans must reflect the purpose of the statute).
'9 Id. at 1557.
120 Id. (stating the goals of Title VII and discussing the legislative history).
121 id.
122 Id. at 1558 (discussing the majority opinion in United States v. Bd. of
Educ. of Tp. of Piscataway, 832 F. Supp. at 845 (D. N.J. 1993)).
123 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563. The Board acknowledged that its purpose
was not to remedy past discrimination but rather to obtain an "educational benefit" by
creating a racially diverse staff. Id.
124 Id. at 1564. Although the court of appeals found that the School Board's
plan violated Title VII on the grounds that the plan did not meet the first prong of
Weber/Johnson, the court nevertheless continued its analysis under the second prong. Id.
Judge Mansman, writing for the majority, announced: "We hold that Piscataway's
affirmative action policy is unlawful because it fails to satisfy either prong of Weber." Id.
This suggests that had the plan satisfied only one prong of the Weber/Johnson analysis
the court would have upheld the plan as permissible under Title VII. Id.
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that the plan lacked the characteristics of those affirmative action
plans that the United States Supreme Court has sustained.'25 The
School Board's affirmative action plan, according to the court, did not
include objectives and guidelines by which to measure progress in
achieving the plan's objectives. 26 As a result, there was nothing to
ensure that the School Board's decisions regarding employment
would actually provide appropriate racial preferences for attaining the
plan's objectives.' 27  For this reason, the court concluded that the
School Board's plan avoidably restrained the progress of nonminority
employees and, therefore, violated Title VII. 128 The court of appeals
ultimately held that the affirmative action plan was impermissible
under Title VII, and upheld the district court's finding that the
Piscataway School Board was liable under the statute.1 29 Following
the Third Circuit's decision, the School Board appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari. 3 °
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's ruling in an 8-4
decision.' 31  Although only four judges dissented, the analysis
articulated by Chief Judge Sloviter is worth exploring."32 The dissent
125 Id. at 1564.
126 Id.
127 id.
121 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564.
129 Id. at 1565. The court, without explaining why it did not address the third
prong of Weber/Johnson, concluded its analysis with the second prong. Id.
130 Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 117 S. Ct. 2506; Piscataway Bd. of
Educ. v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595. This case was removed from the Supreme Court's
docket just weeks before arguments were scheduled to begin because the parties agreed to
a settlement. Id.
131 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1547. Taxman was argued before the entire thirteen-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, but Judge Sarokin
retired before the court issued its opinion. Id.
132 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Sloviter
suggested that the majority's analysis was flawed and similar to that of the district court
in that, the majority reviewed the permissibility of the School Board's affirmative action
plan under Title VII based on the more demanding constitutional standard of review. The
dissent's approach was similar to that employed by the Johnson Court. After examining
the School Board's plan, the Chief Judge concluded that the objectives of the plan in no
way mandated that the School Board select Williams over Taxman. Rather, the plan
"place[d] before the School Board the need to consider minority personnel among other
equally qualified candidates for employment decisions." Id. at 1568-69.
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first addressed the majority's interpretation of Title VII. 133 According
to the Chief Judge, the Supreme Court, in deciding Weber and
Johnson, never declared diversity an impermissible factor that an
employer may not consider in making employment decisions.'
34
Likewise, the Court never declared all purposes, outside of remedying
past discrimination, impermissible in designing an affirmative action
plan.' 35 Chief Judge Sloviter stated that
Title VII was intended, in part, "to eliminate those
patterns that were potential causes of continuing or
future discrimination," and because "racial
homogeneity in schools was viewed as among the
most fundamental and pernicious aspects of the social
pattern undergirding the system of discrimination," the
achievement of diversity, in the educational context
..., is consistent with the purposes underlying Title
VII.
136
The Chief Judge disagreed with the majority that Weber and
Johnson represent a three-prong standard for courts to apply in
adjudicating Title VII challenges to an employer's affirmative action
plan.137 Instead, fie contended that both cases should be understood as
the Court's approval of affirmative action plans not expressly
mirroring the word-for-word interpretation of Title VII. 138  The
dissent suggested that "a racially diverse faculty is consistent with the
goals of Title VII because Congress intended Title VII to be forward-
looking legislation with the broad goal of eliminating the causes of
discrimination."' 139 In essence, Chief Judge Sloviter determined that
... Civil Rights Act of 1964-Title VII-Affirmative Action-Third Circuit
Holds that Diversity Is Not, in Itself a Sufficient Justification for Granting Preferences to
Minorities-Taxman v. Board of Education, 110 HARV. L. REV. 535, 537 (1996).
134 id.
13 Id.
136 Id. (quoting H.R. 88-914, pt. I at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393).
137 Two-Pronged Test for Determining the Validity of Affirmative Action
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affirmative action plans implemented to counter future discrimination
could also reflect the objectives of Title VII. 40 He believed that a
racially diverse faculty could influence students' attitudes in such a
way that will dispel future discriminatory practices in employment
and have a far more reaching impact beyond the context of Piscataway
High School.
14 1
VIII. ARGUMENTS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE HAD PISCATAWAY
TOWNSHIP BOARD OFEDUCATION V. TAXMAN NOT BEEN REMOVED
FROM THE SUPREME COURT CALENDAR
Because this case once topped the Supreme Court's docket,
42
many speculated as to why the Court agreed to hear this case.
43
Some were concerned that the Supreme Court would use Piscataway
Township Board of Education v. Taxman as an opportunity to make
broad rulings on the permissibility of affirmative action in
employment. 44 Others believed that the Court would use this case as
a chance to restrain employers' efforts to promote racial equality. 45
Still others saw this as an opportunity for the Court to abolish
affirmative action plans altogether. 4
6
Much of the interest in this case stemmed from what some
considered the Third Circuit's "over-interpretation" of Title VII and
its holding that affirmative action plans in employment may be used
for remedial purposes only.' 47 This interpretation drew support from
1
40 Id. at 380.
141 See id.
142 See Neil A. Lewis, US. Details its Stance on Bias Remedies: Walking a
Fine Line in Piscataway Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1997, at 8 (stating that this case
would attract the greatest attention of all those currently on the Supreme Court's
calendar).
143 See Robert Cohen, Justice Review Race as a Factor in School Layoff
Piscataway Case Options Weighed, STAR LEDGER, Jan. 22, 1997, at 15. (noting various
views and concerns about the Supreme Court hearing this case).
144 Id.
145 Id. (stating the views of civil rights advocates).
146 Id. (noting that within GOP-controlled Congress there is a strong desire to
eradicate affirmative action programs).
147 See Glenn C. Smith, 'Piscataway' is the Wrong Title VII Test Case,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13, 1997, at A23.
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the American Civil Liberties Union 148 in favor of the School Board to
the extent that affirmative action plans in employment are permissible
for purposes other than remedying past discrimination. 49 The Clinton
Administration's Justice Department, which had decided once again
to support Taxman, 5° agreed that there were circumstances in which
affirmative action could be used for non-remedial purposes.' 51 Even
Sharon Taxman, who disagreed with the manner in which the School
Board set out to pursue its goal, agreed that racial diversity could be a
valid goal of the School Board's plan.'
52
The effects of the issue involved in this case extended well
beyond the two teachers around whom so much controversy arose.1
53
Although Sharon Taxman was a party to the case, 154 the broad reach
of this case was evident in the way the School Board presented the
question to the Court in its petition for appeal.' 55  Specifically, the
question was "whether Title VII still 'permits employers to take race
148 Hannity & Colmes (FOX News Channel, television broadcast Oct. 6,
1997) (moderating a debate between Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil
Liberties Union and Clint Bolick, Litigation Director of the Institute for Justice, during
which, Ms. Strossen stated that the ACLU filed an amicus brief on behalf of the School
Board primarily because of the Court of Appeals' ruling that affirmative action could only
be used to remedy past discrimination).
149 id.
"So See Lewis, supra note 142 (noting that the Justice Department under
President Bush's Administration supported Sharon Taxman; under President Clinton, the
Justice Department decided to switch sides in favor of the School Board, but has since
changed its mind and has returned to supporting Ms. Taxman).
151 See Lewis, supra note 142 (stating that although the Clinton
Administration is no longer supporting the School Board, it does agree that affirmative
action programs can be useful for certain non-remedial purposes). For example, even
without a history of past discrimination, a police department would be allowed to use
diversity as a goal in hiring and promotion, in order to increase minority representation.
Id.
152 See Joseph McCaffrey, Teacher Argues Layoff Was a Race-Bias Play,
STAR LEDGER (NEWARK), Jan. 25, 1995 (reporting that Taxman's attorney, in response to
questions asked by Judge Hutchinson of the Third Circuit, stated that the school board's
goal of racial diversity was valid, but only under certain circumstances, obviously not
present in this case).
153 See Hannity, supra note 148. Ms. Strossen explicitly stated that this case
concerns more than teachers Taxman and Williams. Id.
154 See Pulley, supra note 5, at 32. (stating that although Debra Williams is
not a party to the case, she refuses to be ignored).
155 See Hannity, supra note 148.
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into account for purposes other than remedying past
discrimination."" 56  From Weber and Johnson came an analysis by
which to measure an employer's affirmative action plan against Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.157 That analysis, however, would
not have necessarily made this case any easier for the Supreme Court
to decide because in Weber and Johnson the Court framed the issue
rather narrowly.158  The new issue presented by this case was, in
essence, whether an employer, when making employment decisions,
may take race into account for the purpose of promoting diversity in
an educational environment. 59
On its face, this case seemed rather one-sided because it
appeared to involve clear-cut racial discrimination.160  Realistically,
how much of a defense could the School Board make in support of
laying off a white teacher "just because she is white"?' 6' For this
reason, some concluded that the School Board never stood a chance of
winning in the Supreme Court.162 Nevertheless, in deciding this case,
the Court would have confronted strong arguments not just from
Taxman but from the School Board as well, as demonstrated by a
mock hearing hosted by the College of William and Mary Marshall
Wythe School of Law. 163
156 Savage, supra note 15 (quoting Brief for Appellant, Piscataway Township
Bd. of Educ. v Taxman, No. 96-679).
157 See Buckley, supra note 53; see also Engels, supra note 53.
158 See also Engels, supra note 53 (stating that Weber and Johnson together
fail to distinguish permissible and impermissible purposes for affirmative action).
'59 Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547 (concluding that the purpose of the School Board's
affirmative action plan was to "promote racial diversity 'for education's sake"').
160 Id. at 1552 (stating that Taxman filed an employment discrimination claim
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission after the School Board laid her off
as a result of its affirmative action plan).
161 Rick Hampson, Can Race Decide Who Keeps a Job?, USA TODAY, Oct.
6, 1997, at 14A (stating that "Williams kept her job because she was black; Taxman lost
hers because she was white").
162 See Wickham, supra note 90 (predicting that the School Board would
probably lose this case).
163 Piscataway v. Taxman Moot Court (C-SPAN, television broadcast, Oct.
24, 1997) (an enactment of what arguments counsel for both sides might have made and
how the Court might have ruled had the case been argued before the Supreme Court)
[hereinafter Moot Court].
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During the mock trial, the School Board stood firm in its
assertion that there is a great benefit from diversity in an educational
environment, and, therefore, race should be allowed to be taken into
consideration in employment issues. 164 The School Board stood just
as firm on its belief that race should be of no significance whatsoever
where one teacher has less seniority and is less qualified than
another. 165 The School Board's proposition that there is educational
value in diversity was not new. 166  In fact, this proposition was
familiar to the Supreme Court because it was addressed in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.167
The School Board's affirmative action plan did not expressly
state the time within which the Board targeted to achieve its diversity
goal 68 (the third-prong of Weber). The School Board, however, did
suggest that "backward-looking remedies," designed to eliminate
discrimination and its effects within a specified time frame, are not the
only permissible remedies in implementing an affirmative action plan,
but "forward-looking remedies" are also allowed for the purpose of
attaining racial balance. 69 The Third Circuit agreed that the Court, in
deciding Weber and Johnson, allowed some room for flexibility in
164 See Jaffe, supra note 93 (expounding on the School Board's argument that
diversity should be considered particularly under the circumstances present in this case,
where there are two teachers with equal seniority and deemed equally qualified).
165 Id.
1" Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1561.
167 438 U.S 265 (1978) (involving a constitutional "challenge to the special
admissions program of the Medical School of the University at California at Davis" by a
white applicant who had been denied admission after applying through the regular
admissions program). Bakke, the challenger asserted that he had been denied admission
because the school, through its special admissions program, had reserved 16 out of 100
seats in its entering class for minority applicants who had lower grade point averages and
MCAT scores than he had. Id. The Court found that while the University's special
admissions program was unlawful, the University could take race into account as one
factor in making admissions decision for the purpose of promoting diversity in an
educational environment. Id.
161 Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547.
169 See McCaffrey, supra note 152 (referencing made by the School Board's
attorney).
376 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XV
that the plans in both cases slightly departed from the sole purpose of
remedying past discrimination.
170
The argument that the plan's fatal flaw was that it did not state
a timeframe for achieving diversity was debated in the mock hearing
of Piscataway v. Taxman Moot Court.17 1 Suzanna Sherry, 172 who
portrayed counsel for Piscataway, pointed out that in Johnson the
Court upheld Santa Clara's plan, which did not state a "target end."
She argued that the Supreme Court should allow Piscataway's plan,
which did not state a "target end" because, by promoting diversity, it
would eventually eliminate any vestiges of discrimination and,
therefore, would create an environment where students can appreciate
diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds.
173
In the actual case, the School Board contended that by
retaining Williams based on its desire to foster a diverse environment,
all children, not just black children, benefited. 174 While all children
may have benefited, the School Board should not have felt shy in
asserting the significant benefits afforded black children by fostering
such diversity. 175 As pointed out by Sherry, and echoed by Richard
Carelli, 176 who served as one of the nine justices in the mock hearing,
children should not be led into thinking that black teachers belong in
certain areas and do not belong in others. 177 Carelli continued by
positing that the School Board, by eliminating the only black teacher
in the business department and thus creating an all-white department,
may have discouraged black students from enrolling in business
courses because they may think that it is an "all-white game.78 He
concluded that creating a diverse environment allows students an
opportunity to see that people of different racial and ethnic
170 The court also stated, however, that there was no room for additional non-
remedial departures. Id.
171 Moot Court, supra note 163.
172 Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School.
173 Moot Court, supra note 163.
174 See Hampson, supra note 161.
175 Moot Court, supra note 163.
176 Supreme Court Correspondent for the Associated Press.
177 Moot Court, supra note 163.
178id.
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backgrounds are capable of succeeding in an array of disciplines and
are not just limited to certain fields. 79
One may question how far a school must go to achieve
diversity, 80 and whether it is sufficient to attain diversity on the level
of the school district, or even of the school itself, and not necessarily
at the level of each department. 181 Taxman argued that in addition to
the absence of a history of past discrimination, there was no "manifest
imbalance" on the part of the school because the percentage of black
employees at the school and the percentage of black teachers at the
school were both greater than that of the blacks in the relevant work
force. 82 The School Board's response to this argument was - when
looking at this issue through the eyes of the students - how relevant
is it whether there is imbalance in the larger scheme. 83 What should
matter, the School Board contended, is the students' "frame of
reference" and what they are exposed to in the classroom.' 8
4
In the mock hearing,' 85 Sherry distinguished the Piscataway
case from Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.186 In Wygant, a
group of nonminority teachers challenged the constitutionality of its
School Board's affirmative action policy, adopted through a collective
bargaining agreement. The policy provided that in the event lay-offs
became necessary due to budget constraints, they would be made
based on seniority, but "at no time [would] there be a greater
percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage
of minority personnel employed at the time of the lay-off."' 8 In other
words, if, for example, thirty percent of the school district's faculty
was black, then no more than thirty percent of Jackson School Board's
179 id.
180 See Berkman, supra note 88 (referring to an inquiry by Judge Hutchinson,
Third Circuit, regarding the extent to which courts must go in looking for diversity).
181 Id.
182 See Cohen, supra note 143; Pulley, supra note 5 (stating that "[o]f some
6200 students in Piscataway's schools, 50 percent are white, 30 percent are African-
American, 10 percent are Asian and 5 percent are Hispanic [and] [t]he racial and ethnic
composition of the teaching staff in the district has long reflected the population.").
183 See Berkman, supra note 88.
184 Id.
185 Moot Court, supra note 163.
186 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
187 Id.
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black faculty members could be laid off. Sherry, by emphasizing the
fact that race had been used as a tie-breaker between "identically
situated teachers," distinguished these two cases to show that the
Piscataway School Board's plan did not violate the second prong of
Weber. 18  First, Wygant was brought under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes a stricter
standard than does Title VII. I1 9 Second, the plan in Wygant called for
laying off white teachers who had greater seniority than the black
teachers who were retained.19 On these bases, the Court concluded
that the plan in Wygant "unnecessarily trammeled" the interest of the
white teachers who were laid-off because, based on their seniority, the
white teachers had a 100% level of expectation that they would be
retained. Nevertheless, for the sake of retaining black teachers, the
plan required that the Jackson School Board lay-off white teachers
who would have been retained otherwise. 19 1
Unlike Wygant, the Court in Johnson held that Santa Clara's
plan was permissible because, since the plaintiff had no guarantees
that he would be promoted, the plan did not interfere with his rights
nor should it have diminished his level of expectation. 192 In the mock
hearing, Taxman argued that the cost to the individual laid-off as a
result of an employer's affirmative action plan is too burdensome, and
that in the absence of the School Board's affirmative action plan,
Taxman had at least a fifty percent expectation of being retained.,9 3
By invoking the plan, because she was white, the School Board
eliminated any chance Taxman may have had of the School Board
retaining her.194 Chief Judge Sloviter, however, pointed out that
because Taxman "would have had no more than a fifty percent chance
of not being laid off" had the Board not invoked the plan, she did not
have a "legitimate and firmly rooted expectation of [not being laid
188 Moot Court, supra note 163.
's Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273.
I9o Id. at 271.
191 Id.
192 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 618.
193 Moot Court, supra note 163.
194 Id.
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off]."'195  Accordingly, her rights were not "unnecessarily
trammeled."'19
6
Samuel Issacharoff, 9 7 representing Taxman in the Piscataway
Moot Court, echoed Senator Clark in his remarks that any purposeful
effort to maintain racial balance would violate Title VII because
maintaining that balance requires an employer to make decisions on
the sole basis of race. 19  In Johnson, the Court looked at the express
language of the plan to determine its objective. It concluded that
since there was no mention of a desire to "maintain" a balanced work
force but, rather, a desire to take a "moderate and gradual approach"
in achieving its goal, the Court held that the plan met the third prong
of Weber.199 Like Santa Clara's plan, the School Board's plan made
no mention of a desire to "maintain" a racially balanced work force.
200
The Board's plan evidenced a desire to achieve a racially diverse
teaching staff in an educational environment by considering race in
those cases where two teachers have equal seniority and are deemed
equally qualified.*2
0
Although, at first glance, this case appeared to be stacked
against the School Board, plausible arguments existed on both sides.
Because the case settled, however, one can only speculate about how
Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman might have
played out before the Supreme Court.
195 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1574.
196 Id. at 1576 (stating that "the Board's action was not overly intrusive on
Taxman's rights.")
19' See Case May Test School's Responsibility, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Mar.
23, 1998, at 2A (indicating that Mr. Issacharoff is a law professor at the University of
Texas).
198 See Charles T. Castnady, America's Struggle for Racial Equality, Policy
Review, Jan. 1, 1998, at 42 (quoting Senator Joseph Clark remarks at a congressional
hearing on enacting the statute).
199 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 639-40.
200 See Schuldinger, supra note 18, at 115-17 (reviewing the School Board's
affirmative action plan).
201 See Jaffe, supra note 93.
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IX. THE SETTLEMENT
Less than two months before arguments were scheduled to
begin in the Supreme Court case of Piscataway Township Board of
Education v. Taxman,20 2 another unusual twist was added to the
already unusual facts of this case.203 The case that many anticipated
would establish a new precedent on the permissibility of affirmative
action plans in the workplace was settled.204 Although supporters and
opponents of affirmative action viewed the settlement differently in
terms of whether it tarnished the credibility of those affirmative action
supporter who orchestrated the settlement,20 5 both sides agreed that
the set of facts in this case placed the future of affirmative action in
employment in a vulnerable position.20 6 Opponents of affirmative
action, disappointed that the case was settled,207 criticized those who
financed the settlement for trying to buy time, as they believed the end
is near for race-based preferences. 208 Those in favor of the settlement,
however, viewed it as an effective legal strategy to prevent "bad cases
[from] mak[ing] for bad law."
209
202 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
203 See Linda Greenhouse, Tactical Retreat, New Jersey School Move Leaves
Affirmative Action in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997 at I (stating that the case ended
with an unusual financial settlement, 70 percent of which was financed by a group of civil
rights organizations).
204 See id. (reporting that this case which had developed "into a major
Supreme Court test of the role of race in the workplace" was settled for $433,500,
$186,000 of which Taxman received for $144,000 in back-pay plus interest, and the
remaining $247,500 was paid to her attorneys).
205 See Barry Bearak, Settlement Ends High Court Case on Preferences:
Rights Groups Ducked Fight, Affirmative Action Opponents Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1997 at I (quoting affirmative action supporter, Hugh B. Price, president of the National
Urban League, stating that "[tihis case has such a narrow set of circumstances, and the
fear was that this case could spill over into other factual situations. The Court has ruled
that race can be used as one factor in promoting diversity, and you wouldn't want a wide
ruling that changes that."). The article also quotes affirmative action opponent, attorney
Douglas Cox who stated that this settlement "blows a huge hole" in the credibility of
those who financed the settlement. Id.206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See id. (quoting Roger Clegg, general counsel for the Center of Equal
Opportunity, stating "[tihe people who favor racial preferences are on the run.").
209 See id. (quoting Hugh B. Price).
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Proponents of affirmative action are sure the Supreme Court
will have another opportunity to rule in favor of affirmative action, as
the next case is guaranteed to have a less unusual set of facts than
Taxman. 21  In addition to hoping for a set of facts more favorable
towards affirmative action, supporters also hope for a more favorable
Supreme Court bench, 211 as it has grown more hostile towards
affirmative action plans over the past few decades.
2 12
The settlement of Taxman 213 leaves employers, except those
located in the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, still
unclear as to what purposes they may pursue, through an affirmative
action plan, under Title VIL Although many issues remain
unsettled about what purposes are permissible under Title VII,
215
removing this case from the Supreme Court's docket216 means that the
Third Circuit's broad ruling that affirmative action is only permissible
to remedy past discrimination is still good law.217 Ironically, it was
210 See J. Scott Orr, Affirmative Action Buys Some Breathing Room; After
Piscataway Case, No Pressing Issues, STAR LEDGER (NEWARK), Nov. 23, 1997, at 13
(stating that defenders of affirmative action programs have greater likelihood of winning
the next time a case makes it to the Supreme Court).
211 See Tony Mauro & Gary Fields, Settlement Prolongs Affirmative Action
Fight, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1997, at 4A (quoting Kweisi Mfume, president of the
NAACP, stating that "the [C]ourt could have changed" when the next case involving
affirmative action arises).
212 See id. (discussing how "civil rights groups [view the Supreme Court] as a
place to avoid").
21 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
214 See Bearak, supra note 205 (posing several questions still unanswered,
such as "Is the goal [of affirmative action] simply to treat all people, whatever their race
or gender, the same? Is the legacy of discrimination sufficient reason to give some people
a boost up? Is racial diversity alone sufficient reason to give minority groups an
advantage?").
215 See Greenhouse, supra note 203 (acknowledging that the settlement
"leaves the state of affirmative action law unsettled").
216 See id. (explaining that "in the absence of a live controversy, the Court
lacks jurisdiction under... Article III of the Constitution," so the Court is certain to grant
dismissal pursuant to a joint motion which lawyers for both sides are expected to file).
217 See Harvey Berkman, Supremes May Get Other Affirmative Action Cases,
NATL. L.J., Dec. 8, 1997, at AI0 (stating that the Third Circuit's decision remains
precedent).
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the Third Circuit's ruling that attracted outside support in favor of the
School Board.218
X. CONCLUSION
It has been stated more than once that, because of its unique
circumstances, Taxman was far from an ideal case and a rather
dangerous one for the Supreme Court to use to make a national ruling
on the status of affirmative action in the workplace. In one sense, this
case was bigger than Sharon Taxman and Debra Williams, but in
another, it was difficult to ignore the extent to which this case
impacted both teachers' lives.
The issue in this case extended well beyond these two
teachers. The Third Circuit's ruling that affirmative action can only
be used when remedying past discrimination resulted in pleas to the
high Court to rule narrowly on this case -just enough to overrule the
Third Circuit's "over-interpretation" of Title VII, Weber, and
Johnson. Additionally, there was the issue concerning the value of
racial diversity in an academic setting, but the debate surrounded the
circumstances under which diversity is most beneficial and the
methods by which to achieve that diversity.
In considering these two teachers, it is easier to identify with
the burden placed on Ms. Taxman, as she lost her job because the
School Board concluded that she was dispensable as far as achieving
diversity was concerned. It is a very high price for an individual to
pay when lay-offs are made on the basis of affirmative action. This is
precisely why courts, while allowing affirmative action plans for the
purpose of "attaining" goals, have never allowed these plans for the
purpose of "maintaining" them.
Ms. Williams, although not a party to this case, and often
viewed as the teacher who benefited on account of her race, carried a
burden as well. The silent argument in this case was that while Ms.
Williams was valuable to the School Board in achieving its goal of
racial diversity, her qualifications should not have been overlooked.
Ms. Williams was concerned that the School Board retained her
218 See Hannity, supra note 148; Lewis, supra note 142.
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because of her race rather than because she was better qualified, as she
holds a master's degree and Ms. Taxman does not. This is a subtle
attack on the School Board's use of affirmative action because there is
often a contention that those who are intended to benefit from
affirmative action do so purely based on their status, whether it be
race or gender, and not because they are qualified and capable of
doing the job.
The Piscataway School Board has been criticized for the way
in which it handled this matter, particularly for not making its decision
of which teacher it would retain based on qualifications - after all,
two teachers cannot be identical. However, whether it be good or bad,
had the School Board not invoked its affirmative action plan, this
case, which was slated as the most compelling on the Supreme
Court's docket, would not have occurred. The Third Circuit stated
that although Weber and Johnson upheld affirmative action plans that
did not expressly reflect Title VII objectives of remedying past
discrimination, these cases do not "open the door" for plans
expressing additional non-remedial purposes. In light of the fact that
the Court, in deciding Weber and Johnson, narrowly ruled on the
issues, never clearly distinguishing what purposes are permissible and
what purposes are not under Title VII, the Third Circuit was too
presumptuous in its analysis. In the absence of a clear distinction,
how else will employers know which purposes are permissible and
which are not but for implementing plans for purposes other than
those the Supreme Court enunciated in Weber and Johnson, and the
Third Circuit in Taxman. Employers will have no choice but to
anticipate that their plans will be challenged under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and hope that their cases make their way to
the Supreme Court.
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